The recent period of drawdown of US military forces, has been combined with an increase in the requirements for the use of those forces throughout the spectrum of operations on the planet. An oft cited and published statistic heard and read at the US Army War College is "Missions are up 300% since the drawdown".
The defeat of communism has removed a focal point for our defense energies and resources. In this extended post cold war period, an ever increasing (but not new) set of missions such as; humanitarian relief, peacekeeping and other activities associated with the concept of "nation building" have emerged and seemingly conspired, to consume the often promised, but not fulfilled "peace dividend".
Critics feel participation by the nation's military in these operations is inappropriate. Use of military power in pursuit of the United States' National Security Strategy should not be expended in these operations. The recent confirmation hearing for then Secretary of Defense designate Cohen reinforced the apprehension felt with the nation's military undertaking these missions.
The author disagrees with that criticism. Humanitarian assistance operations are components of both the National Security and National Military Strategies of the United States. Regional instabilities throughout the world will provide increasing rather than fewer opportunities. The nation cannot articulate nor undertake, a National Security Strategy of "Engagement and Enlargement" without participation in these operations.
This strategic research project will: demonstrate how the military's participation in humanitarian affairs operations is supportive of the National Security and Military Strategies; show that these operations adhere to the strategic thought model of ends-ways and means; review the history of these operations which shows that they have been "traditional" as opposed to "nontraditional missions" for the military and; examine the risks that participation presents for the strategic leader.
This project is being written during a period when Congress and the Department of Defense are conducting the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) to evaluate the roles and missions of the nation's military. Out of this review will come future force structure, resourcing and training decisions. The military has been effective in supporting humanitarian assistance operations and will continue to do so. A proactive, realistic engagement of these missions and an understanding of the impact that these undertakings will have on; the future structure, resourcing and training of the Army. It is definitely preferable to ignoring them, in the hope that they will go away. (A) the security interests of both the United States and the country in which the activities are to be carried out (B) the specific operational readiness skills of the members of the armed forces who participate in the activities.
Additionally: " Such activities shall serve the basic economic and social needs of the people and country concerned."
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The current US National Security Strategy is entitled: A National Security
Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. In this document, the Clinton Administration articulates the vision which will drive the nation's policy decisions as it utilizes the power and influence of the United States in the global arena.
Three "Central Goals" are articulated to define the end state which the nation desires in furthering the national security of the United States:
1. To enhance our security with military forces that are ready to fight and with effective representation abroad. 2. To bolster America's economic revitalization. 3. To promote democracy abroad 5 The first of these goals directly relates to the involvement of the military in support of the National Security Strategy. The document further details conditions that will mandate military action to include humanitarian assistance activities. Specifically:
We, therefore, will send American troops abroad only when our interests and values are sufficiently at stake. When we do so, it will be with clear objectives to which we are firmly committed and which -when combat is likely -we have the means to achieve decisively. These requirements are as pertinent for humanitarian and other non -traditional interventions today as they were for previous generations during prolonged world wars" (bold type added for emphasis)
A close examination of this strategy reveals that if the nation perceives it to be in the national security interests, US forces can be inserted, forcibly, if required, into areas of the world requiring humanitarian assistance. This strategy tacitly accepts the situation where some theaters for humanitarian assistance will not allow or encourage a permissive entry of US forces. Also, that military activities in support of humanitarian assistance are likened to the campaigns fought in the two World Wars of this century.
Using the National Security Strategy as a foundation, the National Military 
IS IT REALLY STRATEGIC?:
In the study of the strategic art at the US Army War College students are required to examine the development, application and implementation of strategy in accordance with a three part model. These parts of a strategy are called the ends, ways and means.
"Ends" are the ultimate objectives of a strategy, the "end state". It is the attainment ofthat condition which will determine the success or failure of the strategy. It answers the question "Where are we going?"
"Ways" are the courses of action which will be used to attain the "ends". It attempts to answer the question "How will we get where we are going?"
"Means" are the resources which will be used to in accordance with the "ways" to achieve the "ends". This addresses the question "What will take us there?"
Before undertaking an assessment as to the efficacy of military involvement in humanitarian assistance operations. The National Security and Military Strategies referenced earlier must be analyzed in this context of ends, ways and means. Do these documents meet this standard of truly being strategic?, or merely being called "strategic"?
The three previously detailed "Central Goals" contained in the National Security Strategy meet the criteria of "ends" as defined above. They provide direction and outline an end state or vision to focus the efforts of the administration. The National Military
Strategy provides more specific "ends" and "ways' to accomplish the administrations' Each of these is unique, some were permissive operational environments (non hostile) such as Bangladesh and ultimately Haiti. But the predominance were not and, are not "risk free" operational environments, as evidenced by the casualties sustained there.
Nor, is there any evidence of this trend being reversed in the future. The military receives these missions because of a successful record ,over time, of undertaking and accomplishing them. This requires an examination of how the military, defines, categorizes and doctrinally addresses the participation in these operations. For the "devils" which can complicate these operations will be located in those details.
HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS DEFINED
At the joint operations level, Joint Publication 3-07 ( Joint Doctrine for
Military Operations Other Than War) defines humanitarian assistance as:
Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance. 1 It is critical, however, to highlight the fact that each of these missions is not conducted in isolation. For example, the mission to restore democracy in Haiti, began as a punitive intrusion, the actual act of the US deployment was then a demonstration of leverage. With the abdication of the government in Haiti in favor of President Aristede, our mission then transformed into one of reassurance and humanitarian assistance. There are no absolute missions, no boundaries between types of mission. The missions for the army, outlined in the army vision, will be ever transitioning. Soldiers deployed for combat will, upon conflict termination, find themselves engaged in other missions to include humanitarian activities. Nor, is it expected that these activities can be delegated to units with certain capabilities, allowing them to focus energy on these types of missions, while other units with different capabilities, focus on other types of missions.
In the specific matter of Humanitarian assistance missions, the army vision statement further delineates these missions into four categories which require combinations of Army capabilities and types of forces as shown below. and Operation Restore Hope (Somalia) are two examples of theaters of operation where entry was "nonpermissive". Forces were engaged in both fighting and providing humanitarian assistance. This was due to the fact that host nation forces were involved in combat, combat which in fact had caused the need for the humanitarian relief . In contrast, Operation Sea Angel (Bangladesh) was an example of "permissive " entry. Forces were invited in and not at risk from combat.
HUMANITARIAN REQUIRED CAPABILITIES MISSIONS
What will the US response be when a humanitarian crisis is but one dimension of a complex contingency? Future Army missions will be transitory.
Possibly moving through a mission continuum of; defending territory, core security, culminating in humanitarian support, all in a single operation. Most notably, Artillery, Air Defense Artillery and Antiarmor skills appeared to quickly degrade due to lack of opportunities to utilize or train on them while
deployed.
Army commanders interviewed for the report estimated that 3-6 months would be required to restore combat effectiveness. Their assessment being that in addition to the individual skills, maneuver, collective and synchronization skills would require the greatest training attention .
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Upon revisiting these units after redeployment to their home stations, the GAO found this assessment to be accurate. After a four month deployment to Haiti, the Commanding General of the 
CONCLUSION:
I do not underestimate the cost or complexity of launching a peaceful revolution for progress in the Third World. But we have the economic resources. We have the skilled manpower and the brainpower. Our national interest requires it. There is only one nagging question. British strategist Sir Robert Thompson once wrote, "National strength equals manpower plus applied resources times will.". Do we have the will to undertake such a bold initiative? Americans don't like to play a role on the world stage.... We must not turn away from our responsibilities in the world. If we refuse to play a major role, the rest of the free world will be at the mercy of totalitarian aggressors." (Richard Nixon, No More Vietnams.
1985)
38 Though twelve years have passed since Nixon's words were written. They sum up the challenge the nation faces in a world absent a unifying threat. The threats today will increase and with them the opportunities for American military involvement in these regions which will require humanitarian assistance. This increase will draw its growth from three sources: failure of democratic experiments; long standing ethnic and tribal conflicts; and the collapse of 39 autocratic regimes.
For the United States to engage and enlarge democracy and bolster our economic revitalization will require a military capable of operating in this environment. Yet, the present Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff best expresses the military's apprehensions " We have the capability like almost no one else to help with tragedies of the magnitude we are witnessing in Rwanda. My fear is we're becoming mesmerized by OOTW (Operations Other Than War) and we'll take our mind off what we're all about, which is to fight and win our nation's
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wars The roots of a resolution to this challenge can be found in two locations.
First, the Army must look to the Reserve Components to pick up an extended portion of these missions, especially since larger portions of our CSS structure have been placed in the reserve components. Second, the nation must continue the practices recently used in the latest humanitarian emergency involving Rwanda and Zaire. We refused to rush in unilaterally, rather we both patiently assisted in the assembly of a multilateral force and directed the theater CINC (EUCOM) to dispatch an assessment team to determine the best force mix to meet the requirements. As a result, the parties involved desisted in their hostilities and Non Governmental Organizations were allowed to continue their relief missions.
Finally, it is important to note that at no time has the military refused the imposition of such a mission. The Army cannot be everywhere and do everything, until we determine our "breaking point" the nation will continue to expect us to undertake these missions. We historically have done them and done them well.
